<p>Post-earthquake waste disposal planning constitutes a critical preliminary stage of post-disaster reconstruction. The efficacy of collaboration among stakeholders in this phase directly impacts environmental and social benefits. Nevertheless, there is a deficiency of a clearly defined collaborative mechanism between governments and enterprises during post-earthquake waste disposal. Therefore, this paper commences from the post-disaster reconstruction phase, formulating a two-sided evolutionary game model for local governments and waste management enterprises grounded in the perspective of bounded rationality. The model employs replicator dynamics to analyze evolutionary stable strategies and equilibrium conditions. It is further refined by incorporating prospect theory to explore the dynamic mechanisms through which governmental supervisory intensity and enterprise technological choices interact. Additionally, this study examines how various factors influence decision-making processes at both government and enterprise levels. The theoretical model and its equilibrium results are validated through a realistic case simulation based on the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. The findings reveal that government-enterprise collaboration is inherently unstable and highly sensitive to synergistic parameter effects. For instance, collaboration is significantly promoted by increasing policy tax incentives alongside either higher enterprise revenues or lower government supervision costs. Analysis of enterprise decision-making indicates that the key strategic trade-off involves balancing the costs of resource utilization against the additional benefits gained and the potential losses incurred from neglecting such utilization. Furthermore, social prestige gains exert an implicit influence by affecting the probability of mass incidents and the degree of loss aversion within the government-enterprise synergy.</p>