<p>Designing fair and efficient blockchain reward mechanisms requires going beyond raw execution time to account for behavioral variability. We present a simulation framework for evaluating BCRPs using entropy as a systems-level indicator of reward fairness and stability. Three strategies are assessed on simulated miner profiles <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:(n=100)\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> with log-normal execution times, Laplace-distributed noise, and tercile-based complexity classes: a classical execution-time baseline, “Mining <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.0\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>” (penalizing miner noise and task complexity), and “Adaptive <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.0\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>” (Mining <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.0\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> with exponential time decay). Reward distributions are summarized via KDE and ECDF and scored using Shannon, Rényi <InlineEquation ID="IEq5"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:(\alpha\:=2)\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, Tsallis <InlineEquation ID="IEq6"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:(q=2)\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, and normalized Shannon entropies computed on discretized rewards (<InlineEquation ID="IEq7"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:20\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> bins). An interactive Shiny application accompanies the method for reproducible exploration without programming. Across simulations, Adaptive <InlineEquation ID="IEq8"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.0\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> yields the most behavior-sensitive and equitable allocations, achieving the lowest entropy on all four metrics. Quantitatively, relative to the Traditional baseline, Adaptive <InlineEquation ID="IEq9"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.0\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> reduces entropy by <InlineEquation ID="IEq10"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:37.5\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (Shannon: <InlineEquation ID="IEq11"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.684\to\:1.678\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>), <InlineEquation ID="IEq12"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:37.1\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (Rényi-<InlineEquation ID="IEq13"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>: <InlineEquation ID="IEq14"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.218\to\:1.396\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>), <InlineEquation ID="IEq15"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:21.0\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (Tsallis-<InlineEquation ID="IEq16"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>: <InlineEquation ID="IEq17"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:0.785\to\:0.620\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>), and <InlineEquation ID="IEq18"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:14.6\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (Normalized: <InlineEquation ID="IEq19"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:0.847\to\:0.723\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>); Mining <InlineEquation ID="IEq20"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:2.0\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> achieves intermediate improvements of <InlineEquation ID="IEq21"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:29.8\%,\:31.7\%,\:17.2\%,\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and <InlineEquation ID="IEq22"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:13.9\%,\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> respectively. These results provide an evidence-based, deployable framework for evaluating reward fairness in decentralized systems.</p>

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Next-generation protocol design for blockchain rewards with web-tool

  • Muhammad Zeshan Arshad,
  • Ali Algarni

摘要

Designing fair and efficient blockchain reward mechanisms requires going beyond raw execution time to account for behavioral variability. We present a simulation framework for evaluating BCRPs using entropy as a systems-level indicator of reward fairness and stability. Three strategies are assessed on simulated miner profiles \(\:(n=100)\) with log-normal execution times, Laplace-distributed noise, and tercile-based complexity classes: a classical execution-time baseline, “Mining \(\:2.0\) ” (penalizing miner noise and task complexity), and “Adaptive \(\:2.0\) ” (Mining \(\:2.0\) with exponential time decay). Reward distributions are summarized via KDE and ECDF and scored using Shannon, Rényi \(\:(\alpha\:=2)\) , Tsallis \(\:(q=2)\) , and normalized Shannon entropies computed on discretized rewards ( \(\:20\) bins). An interactive Shiny application accompanies the method for reproducible exploration without programming. Across simulations, Adaptive \(\:2.0\) yields the most behavior-sensitive and equitable allocations, achieving the lowest entropy on all four metrics. Quantitatively, relative to the Traditional baseline, Adaptive \(\:2.0\) reduces entropy by \(\:37.5\%\) (Shannon: \(\:2.684\to\:1.678\) ), \(\:37.1\%\) (Rényi- \(\:2\) : \(\:2.218\to\:1.396\) ), \(\:21.0\%\) (Tsallis- \(\:2\) : \(\:0.785\to\:0.620\) ), and \(\:14.6\%\) (Normalized: \(\:0.847\to\:0.723\) ); Mining \(\:2.0\) achieves intermediate improvements of \(\:29.8\%,\:31.7\%,\:17.2\%,\) and \(\:13.9\%,\) respectively. These results provide an evidence-based, deployable framework for evaluating reward fairness in decentralized systems.