<p>In the electronic product supply chain, misreporting behaviors caused by information asymmetry are not uncommon. The application of blockchain technology plays a significant role in curbing such misreporting behaviors. Therefore, this study, leveraging Stackelberg game theory, focuses on the motivation of the manufacturer in the electronic product supply chain to misreport cost information, and explores the impact of this misreporting behavior on supply chain decisions. Based on this, blockchain technology is introduced into the supply chain model to further analyze the decision-making and coordination issues of the supply chain in its application scenarios. When constructing the model, this study incorporates the influence of quality control levels on product market demand and after-sales rate, and, in combination with the characteristics of electronic products, depicts the classification function of after-sales services. Through analysis, the main conclusions of this study are as follows: The manufacturer chooses to misreport only when it loses its dominant position, and the final misreporting decision will cause the retailer to lose the game advantage and is unfavorable to the supply chain; the retailer will take the initiative to introduce blockchain technology only when the cost of blockchain is less than a certain value, and whether the supply chain benefits from blockchain introduction depends on its cost; with the help of blockchain technology, the quality control level of products can be improved and the supply chain can reach a coordinated state.</p>