<p>The resurgence of economic nationalism and the securitization of international trade have created challenges for the multilateral trading system. Increasing reliance by major powers on unilateral trade measures, export controls, strategic subsidies, and national security exceptions has raised concerns about the World Trade Organization's (WTO) capacity to maintain a predictable trading order. These developments are problematic for developing countries that depend on stable market access and multilateral disciplines. This study examines whether the existing WTO legal framework remains capable of governing international trade amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry and economic security competition. Employing a doctrinal and analytical methodology, it analyzes WTO agreements, dispute settlement jurisprudence, scholarly literature, and state practices affecting strategic industries and critical technologies. The findings reveal that the use of security-based trade measures exposes structural weaknesses in WTO law, particularly regarding security exceptions, subsidy regulation, and the effectiveness of dispute settlement. Nevertheless, the study finds that abandoning the WTO-centered system would accelerate legal fragmentation and disproportionately harm developing countries. It concludes that adaptation rather than abandonment is necessary and recommends clarifying security exceptions, strengthening subsidy disciplines, enhancing transparency, and restoring a dispute settlement mechanism to balance national security interests with international economic cooperation.</p>