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<p>This paper examines how “multipolarity” is framed across digital and academic venues and how these framings may relate to soft- and hard-power narratives. We analyze: (i) TikTok hashtag co-occurrence networks for #multipolarity and #MultipolarworldRU, (ii) Telegram message-forwarding centered on “Eurasia &amp; Multipolarity,” (iii) Web of Science keyword co-occurrences in International Relations/Political Science, and (iv) Google Ngram trajectories for related terms across eight languages. We describe clusters, rhetorical motifs, and co-occurrence patterns; we do not infer causality, exposure, persuasion, or preference change. Digital discourse appears heterogeneous (some state-adjacent, some grassroots), while academic discourse emphasizes established IR constructs (e.g., polarity, balance of power, BRICS). Findings are illustrative, not exhaustive, and constrained by platform affordances, sampling, and measurement error. We close by outlining implications for studying “platformed geopolitics.” Consistent with the descriptive scope of our design, we foreground limitations in data coverage, representativeness, and interpretability, and we avoid any inference about persuasion or policy impact.</p>

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Mapping multipolarity: soft and hard power in the digital age

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月28日

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  • Ana Rodica Stăiculescu,
  • Emanuela Bran,
  • Andra Seceleanu,
  • Aurel Papari

摘要

This paper examines how “multipolarity” is framed across digital and academic venues and how these framings may relate to soft- and hard-power narratives. We analyze: (i) TikTok hashtag co-occurrence networks for #multipolarity and #MultipolarworldRU, (ii) Telegram message-forwarding centered on “Eurasia & Multipolarity,” (iii) Web of Science keyword co-occurrences in International Relations/Political Science, and (iv) Google Ngram trajectories for related terms across eight languages. We describe clusters, rhetorical motifs, and co-occurrence patterns; we do not infer causality, exposure, persuasion, or preference change. Digital discourse appears heterogeneous (some state-adjacent, some grassroots), while academic discourse emphasizes established IR constructs (e.g., polarity, balance of power, BRICS). Findings are illustrative, not exhaustive, and constrained by platform affordances, sampling, and measurement error. We close by outlining implications for studying “platformed geopolitics.” Consistent with the descriptive scope of our design, we foreground limitations in data coverage, representativeness, and interpretability, and we avoid any inference about persuasion or policy impact.