The Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem is a fundamental challenge in distributed systems, focusing on achieving reaching an agreement among parties, some of which may behave maliciously. With the rise of cryptocurrencies, there has been significant interest in developing atomic broadcast protocols, which facilitate agreement on a subset of parties’ requests. However, these protocols often come with high communication complexity ( \(O(ln^2 + \lambda n^3 \log n)\) , where l is the bit length of the input, n is the number of parties, and λ represents the security parameter bit length). This can lead to inefficiency, especially when the requests across parties exhibit little variation, resulting in unnecessary resource consumption. In this paper, we introduce Slim-ABC, a novel atomic broadcast protocol that eliminates the \(O(ln^2 + \lambda n^3 \log n)\) term associated with traditional atomic broadcast protocols. While Slim-ABC reduces the number of accepted requests, it significantly mitigates resource wastage, making it more efficient. The protocol leverages the asynchronous common subset and provable-broadcast mechanisms to achieve a communication complexity of \(O(ln^2 + \lambda n^2)\) . Despite the trade-off in accepted requests, Slim-ABC maintains robust security by allowing only a fraction (f +1) of parties to broadcast requests. We present an extensive efficiency analysis of Slim-ABC, evaluating its performance across key metrics such as message complexity, communication complexity, and time complexity. Additionally, we provide a rigorous security analysis, demonstrating that Slim-ABC satisfies the agreement, validity, and totality properties of the asynchronous common subset protocol.
