Differential Disruption and Epistemic Injustice
摘要
Recent scholarship on technology-induced and mediated ‘social disruption’ has introduced the notion of differential disruption to highlight how technological change might privilege some agents or groups, while contributing to the marginalization of others. However, the ethical foundations of differential disruption are still underdeveloped: some existing understandings of the concept are purely descriptive and fail to thematize its normative dimension. In the first part of this article we develop and defend a substantive normative account of differential disruption. In the second part we operationalize this account in the context of epistemic justice. We argue that while distributive or capability-based frameworks can be helpful in countering epistemic injustice, more is needed to mitigate technologies’ differential effects. A normative account of differential disruption must draw on a broad set of justice-based considerations, including epistemic friction and critical participatory approaches.