<p>Since the advent of the so-called Chicago School, competition law has been interpreted as a tool mainly concerned to economic efficiency, and without particular ties with the social values posed at the basis of our societies. However, the rising tide of income inequality and the continuously increase of market concentration rates, especially in digital markets, raised concerns about the correctness of the welfarist approach to antitrust. In particular, and in light of the current social issues, doubts may be casted about the fact that a policy tool such as competition law could not be part of the possible solutions. This paper, through a comparative analysis of the evolution of measures directed at protecting competition both in the U.S. and in the European Union, aims at providing solid theoretical and economic bases in order to suggest a shift in the way in which competition rules are interpreted and applied. What emerges from this analysis is that a (re)turn towards a structuralist approach aimed at protecting competition as an institution and at taking into consideration social values is particularly needed and this shift is well rooted in both our constitutional traditions and in economics.</p>