<p>In their works, Bueno and Shalkowski, on the one hand, offer critical assessments of dominant modal epistemologies that rely primarily on sources such as intuition, inference to the best explanation, and similarity-based induction. On the other hand, they develop a modest modal epistemology that appeals to plausible inferential principles, knowledge of actuality, and background theoretical knowledge within the metaphysical framework of modalism. In this paper, I argue that their critical assessments of rival accounts are in tension with their own modal epistemology. In other words, the very strategies and criteria they deploy against earlier modal epistemologies ultimately rebound and threaten their own account. For example, the strategy they use in critiquing intuition-based modal epistemology can also be applied to sources such as perception, which should play a central role in their own epistemology. I further argue that this tension pushes them toward a more skeptical position than the one they initially defend. To avoid this outcome, I suggest two possible responses. First, they might reconsider their criticisms and adopt a more liberal modal epistemology that remains open to the very sources of modal knowledge they criticize, such as intuition. Second, they could provide a more detailed account of why the sources they appeal to are exempt from the objections they raise against rival views. However, both responses require additional theoretical work.</p>