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<p>The problem of evil is a problem for everyone; anyone can wonder about the possibility of there being evil in the world if there is God. However, the problem of evil is typically regarded as a challenge for theism, not atheism. In <i>The Problem of Evil for Atheists</i> (2024), Yujin Nagasawa argues that, contrary to the common picture, there is a problem of evil that challenges atheists as well as theists, and that theists are in a better position to deal with it. After reviewing how this project proceeds, I argue against its success. Nagasawa focuses on a specific version of the problem of evil which appeals to “axiological evil” rather than “deontological evil.” I explain why this is not acceptable—the traditional problem of evil involves both axiological and deontological claims. Therefore, it is dubious whether the problem of evil can be formulated in a way that targets atheism as it does in the case of theism. I suggest that distinguishing three modes of the problem of evil also sheds light on this debate. The problem of evil as a <i>curiosity</i> question is open to everyone, regardless of systemic evil. However, systemic evil makes the <i>decision</i> mode of the problem of evil relevant to everyone, even if it does not raise the <i>challenge</i> mode of the problem in the same way for everyone.</p>

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Need for secular theodicies?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月22日

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  • Seyyed Mohsen Eslami

摘要

The problem of evil is a problem for everyone; anyone can wonder about the possibility of there being evil in the world if there is God. However, the problem of evil is typically regarded as a challenge for theism, not atheism. In The Problem of Evil for Atheists (2024), Yujin Nagasawa argues that, contrary to the common picture, there is a problem of evil that challenges atheists as well as theists, and that theists are in a better position to deal with it. After reviewing how this project proceeds, I argue against its success. Nagasawa focuses on a specific version of the problem of evil which appeals to “axiological evil” rather than “deontological evil.” I explain why this is not acceptable—the traditional problem of evil involves both axiological and deontological claims. Therefore, it is dubious whether the problem of evil can be formulated in a way that targets atheism as it does in the case of theism. I suggest that distinguishing three modes of the problem of evil also sheds light on this debate. The problem of evil as a curiosity question is open to everyone, regardless of systemic evil. However, systemic evil makes the decision mode of the problem of evil relevant to everyone, even if it does not raise the challenge mode of the problem in the same way for everyone.