Scholarlink

<p>In <i>Social Goodness</i>, Charlotte Witt holds that any adequate account of social role normativity must explain the resources available to critical selves. Her artisanal model identifies two such resources: habituation, which engenders practical mastery along with a habit of excellence, and an articulated grasp of the practice’s know-why. I argue that these resources remain limited because the artisanal model under-theorises the linguistic dimension of social normativity. I draw attention to three aspects of discursive normativity that together show why language is indispensable for understanding critical agency. First, articulating a norm is a practical intervention that places the norm itself at issue through publicly attributable commitments. Second, linguistically articulated reasons circulate across practices, introducing heterogeneous normative pressures that local expertise alone cannot register. Third, performative speech acts institute roles and deontic commitments independently of telic excellence. Taken together, these dimensions show that discursive practices supply critical selves with resources that are not exhausted by habituation or know-why.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Discursive normativity and the resources of critical selves

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月26日

查看全文
  • Sandro Guli

摘要

In Social Goodness, Charlotte Witt holds that any adequate account of social role normativity must explain the resources available to critical selves. Her artisanal model identifies two such resources: habituation, which engenders practical mastery along with a habit of excellence, and an articulated grasp of the practice’s know-why. I argue that these resources remain limited because the artisanal model under-theorises the linguistic dimension of social normativity. I draw attention to three aspects of discursive normativity that together show why language is indispensable for understanding critical agency. First, articulating a norm is a practical intervention that places the norm itself at issue through publicly attributable commitments. Second, linguistically articulated reasons circulate across practices, introducing heterogeneous normative pressures that local expertise alone cannot register. Third, performative speech acts institute roles and deontic commitments independently of telic excellence. Taken together, these dimensions show that discursive practices supply critical selves with resources that are not exhausted by habituation or know-why.