<p>Chase Wrenn’s <i>The True and the Good</i> defends Strong Virtue Theory on which the apparent value of truth derives from the moral value of truthfulness. On this view, we ought to care about true beliefs not because truth itself is valuable, but because valuing truth manifests a socially beneficial virtue. This paper challenges Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory on two fronts. First, it shows that grounding the value of truthfulness on personal or social flourishing cannot avoid an appeal to the value of truth itself. Second, it argues that Wrenn’s appeal to ‘state-given’ reasons and ‘striving play’ analogies faces a motivational and critical deficit, especially in non-ideal epistemic environments shaped by prejudice and polarisation. It then develops an alternative account. Drawing on Sosa-inspired concept of belief as a goal-oriented attempt, it argues that truth has non-instrumental, constitutive epistemic value: it is essential to the aim of belief itself. This preserves a deflationary concept of truth while securing a robust basis for its constitutive epistemic value.</p>