Do future generations have rights?
摘要
Jeff Sebo’s The Moral Circle deserves high praise. In this article I outline several reasons why. I particularly cherish Sebo’s invitation for philosophers to remain humble about their frameworks when it comes to defining the boundaries of the moral circle. Accordingly, even though my sentience-based framework commits me to the view that future generations have no rights, I nonetheless seek in the paper to find a way to include them. Given that morality is not only about rights, future generations can be part of our moral circle if we have duties towards them. I argue that we do have duties imposed by the Harm Prevention Principle: present generations must, as far as possible, prevent foreseeable harm to future generations by taking action to prevent climate change. This is a very demanding duty which requires a deep transformation of our social, political, and economic arrangements. However, this is not a limitless duty. In our care for future generations, we cannot trample on the fundamental rights of present generations. So, the wellbeing of future generations is important—the subject of a very demanding duty—but it cannot be prioritised over the rights of present generations.