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<p>In <i>Social Goodness</i>, Witt argues that social role normativity is both distinct from morality or prudence, and exists independently of role-players’ attitudes. She also argues that the relationship between techniques and expertise, which constitutes the artisanal model, best explains the development of social role norms. I consider how internal conditions impact social role normativity and then raise two challenges to Witt’s ideas. First, I argue that agent-relative (i.e. internal) conditions can shape the contents and source of role obligations through state regulation. Internal conditions are necessary to legitimate institutional mediation regarding the development of social role norms, thereby creating a form of normative dualism that can counter Witt’s criticism of internalism. Second, I argue that some social roles generate alienation because they make the role-occupiers fail to reflect on the value of, and their connection to, the roles. This issue is beyond the grip of Witt’s theory, implying that internal conditions are necessary to understand the problem of alienating social roles.</p>

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How internal conditions matter to social role normativity

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月26日

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  • Chia-Hung Huang

摘要

In Social Goodness, Witt argues that social role normativity is both distinct from morality or prudence, and exists independently of role-players’ attitudes. She also argues that the relationship between techniques and expertise, which constitutes the artisanal model, best explains the development of social role norms. I consider how internal conditions impact social role normativity and then raise two challenges to Witt’s ideas. First, I argue that agent-relative (i.e. internal) conditions can shape the contents and source of role obligations through state regulation. Internal conditions are necessary to legitimate institutional mediation regarding the development of social role norms, thereby creating a form of normative dualism that can counter Witt’s criticism of internalism. Second, I argue that some social roles generate alienation because they make the role-occupiers fail to reflect on the value of, and their connection to, the roles. This issue is beyond the grip of Witt’s theory, implying that internal conditions are necessary to understand the problem of alienating social roles.