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<p>Goldstein and Kirk–Giannini have recently argued that artificial language agents can possess well-being in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Here, I challenge their position, contending that their arguments fail to establish that consciousness is dispensable for well-being. Moreover, their arguments generate counterintuitive implications that are more problematic than those they attribute to views requiring consciousness for welfare subjecthood. Thus, consciousness&#xa0;(or rather sentience) should still be treated as a requirement for AI welfare.</p>

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Is consciousness required for AI welfare?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月5日

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  • Walter Veit

摘要

Goldstein and Kirk–Giannini have recently argued that artificial language agents can possess well-being in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Here, I challenge their position, contending that their arguments fail to establish that consciousness is dispensable for well-being. Moreover, their arguments generate counterintuitive implications that are more problematic than those they attribute to views requiring consciousness for welfare subjecthood. Thus, consciousness (or rather sentience) should still be treated as a requirement for AI welfare.