<p>Evolutionary theory has been invoked in arguments both in support of scientific realism and in support of scientific antirealism. I will call the strategy of appealing to evolutionary theory in either context “the selectionist strategy.” Is the selectionist strategy ever philosophically legitimate? The Korean philosopher Seungbae Park (Park, Axiomathes 27:321–332, 2017) raises this question and argues that the selectionist strategy is question-begging when deployed in support of realism and self-defeating when deployed in support of antirealism. He further maintains that being self-defeating is a more serious argumentative flaw than being question-begging, since question-begging arguments merely lack persuasiveness, whereas self-defeating arguments generate contradictions. My primary concern in this paper is with Park’s critique of antirealist appeals to selectionism, rather than with his discussion of realist appeals, and I argue that Park’s objections to selectionism as an antirealist strategy are not well-founded.</p>