<p>Consciousness studies have relied on the subject’s remembering capacity as the primary tool for identifying and measuring selfless states, i.e., conscious states without self-consciousness. This paper critically examines whether memory can serve such a role. After outlining the requirements that remembering must meet when deployed in studies of selfless consciousness, I evaluate its competence accordingly. On this basis, I argue for three epistemic challenges to the use of remembering in the study of selfless states: one corresponds to the well-discussed memory challenge of selfless report in the literature, while the other two—the zero-inflation challenge and the measurement challenge—are newly introduced. Specifically, the memory challenge concerns avoiding false negatives—selfless states misclassified as self-conscious. The zero-inflation challenge concerns avoiding false positives—self-conscious states misclassified as selfless. And the measurement challenge concerns reliably capturing the non-self-related aspects of experience within selfless states.</p>