<p>Since the day the term ‘aphantasia’ was coined, it has been used to refer to the inability to generate mental imagery in one’s mind. This standard view classifying aphantasia as a mental imagery condition was recently challenged by Blomkvist’s episodic memory account, according to which aphantasia should be best explained as an episodic system condition, especially deficiencies in episodic memory processes. This paper provides an in-depth comparison of different explanatory approaches to aphantasia, arguing that the standard view is preferable to Blomkvist’s novel account. After sketching out Blomkvist’s proposed model—the CESH + model, which is based on the concept of the episodic simulation system—we demonstrate that this model faces a dilemma. That is, on the one hand, if Blomkvist prioritises the explanatory role of episodic system condition, then her CESH + model would have difficulty in differentiating aphantasia from other episodic construction system disorders such as amnesia. On the other hand, if she were to avoid this problem by treating aphantasia as a specific type of malfunction particularly pertaining to mental imagery, then what plays the substantial explanatory role in this picture would still be mental imagery. After that, we demonstrate that the standard view not only avoids the defects of the CESH + model, but also provides a comprehensive explanation for the various symptoms of aphantasia. Therefore, classifying aphantasia as a mental imagery condition offers a superior explanation.</p>