<p>Contrary to Pritchard’s claims, in this article I argue that Newman’s version of the thesis of the independence of conviction does not offer an intellectualized, epistemological conception of reflective assent. On the contrary, I argue that Pritchard’s project of a defence of religious belief based on a parity argument fares much better under a Newmanian interpretation of dubitability, legitimation, and reflective certitude; and that Newman’s insights are instrumental for the effective defence of a middle way between rationalism and fideism against the charges that it is an inherently unstable position, and, relatedly, that it results in a disturbing combination of radical scepticism with irrational dogmatism. With the foregoing in mind, it ought to be possible to reconstruct Pritchard’s general and religious epistemology from the common, normative root of contentful, concrete certainties that Newman provides. This reconstruction will demand some important re-adjustments in Pritchard’s account. However, they will not be large enough so as to make Pritchard’s position unrecognizable. I also suggest that Newman’s rejection of the logical model of reasoning and Pritchard’s tendency to detranscendentalize certainty express substantive agreement. On the face of this suggestion, we may locate a very fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the two thinkers—namely, the idea of genuine modes of reasoning that are not subjected to formal and mechanical rules. Curiously, a Newmanian reinterpretation of Pritchard’s epistemology may help to make the latter more closely aligned with Wittgenstein.</p>