<p>In his book <i>How to Take Skepticism Seriously</i>, Adam Leite defends the efforts of Moore and Austin to show that the skeptic’s assumptions are at odds with ordinary epistemic practice. In these comments, I want to raise two questions. The first question concerns the extent of what counts as “ordinary epistemic practice.” While various plausible general principles concerning knowledge and justified belief clearly count as part of this practice, do various recondite, or even potentially controversial, empirical claims also count as part of this practice? The second question I want to raise concerns just what it is that Leite can claim to have shown about the truth of skepticism, even granting that he has shown that the case for skepticism cannot be made from within ordinary epistemic practice. If we grant that Leite has shown that much, we can conclude that ordinary epistemic practice does not undermine itself. But should this somehow reassure us of the truth of our ordinary knowledge attributions, or otherwise alter our attitudes concerning those attributions?</p>