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<p>In <i>The True and the Good</i>: <i>A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth&#xa0;</i>(2023), Wrenn argues for a strong virtue theory of the value of truth. What makes truth valuable is <i>Truthfulness</i>, a human virtue. We value truth because we ought to be Truthful, and not vice versa (state-given). Therefore, he argues that the truth of a proposition as such does not confer value to states of believing it. I disagree. I argue that Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth is either <i>too strong</i> or simply false. In any case, my main argument is based on a thought experiment that is supposed to challenge his theory, and pump our intuition that truth as such confers value on states of believing it (object-given). I also point to some issues that concern the compatibility of Aristotelianism and truth’s value, and also the formulation of the Strong Virtue Theory.</p>

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Is Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory of the value of truth too strong?

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月26日

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  • Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler

摘要

In The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth (2023), Wrenn argues for a strong virtue theory of the value of truth. What makes truth valuable is Truthfulness, a human virtue. We value truth because we ought to be Truthful, and not vice versa (state-given). Therefore, he argues that the truth of a proposition as such does not confer value to states of believing it. I disagree. I argue that Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth is either too strong or simply false. In any case, my main argument is based on a thought experiment that is supposed to challenge his theory, and pump our intuition that truth as such confers value on states of believing it (object-given). I also point to some issues that concern the compatibility of Aristotelianism and truth’s value, and also the formulation of the Strong Virtue Theory.