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<p>In his clear, engaging, and highly original book, <i>The Problem of Evil for Atheists</i> (Nagasawa 2024), Yujin Nagasawa aims to defend two theses: “First, the problem of evil is (nearly) everyone’s problem, so everyone has to take it seriously. Second, the problem may well be a more formidable obstacle for naturalist atheists/non-theists than for supernaturalist theists” (p. 3). I focus my attention on the problem Nagasawa presents for pantheism. Nagasawa argues that a standard version of pantheism is vulnerable to what he christens the “divinity problem of evil.” I argue that the success of Nagasawa’s argument for the problem of evil for pantheism rests on controversial assumptions about the shared commitments of pantheistic proposals. I present a version of generic pantheism that is not vulnerable to the divinity problem of evil and I sketch a version of personal pantheism that has additional resources to respond to the problem of evil (and may do better than traditional theism).</p>

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Clarifying the metaphysics of pantheism to better assess the threat posed by the problem of evil identified by Nagasawa in The Problem of Evil for Atheists

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月11日

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  • Andrei A. Buckareff

摘要

In his clear, engaging, and highly original book, The Problem of Evil for Atheists (Nagasawa 2024), Yujin Nagasawa aims to defend two theses: “First, the problem of evil is (nearly) everyone’s problem, so everyone has to take it seriously. Second, the problem may well be a more formidable obstacle for naturalist atheists/non-theists than for supernaturalist theists” (p. 3). I focus my attention on the problem Nagasawa presents for pantheism. Nagasawa argues that a standard version of pantheism is vulnerable to what he christens the “divinity problem of evil.” I argue that the success of Nagasawa’s argument for the problem of evil for pantheism rests on controversial assumptions about the shared commitments of pantheistic proposals. I present a version of generic pantheism that is not vulnerable to the divinity problem of evil and I sketch a version of personal pantheism that has additional resources to respond to the problem of evil (and may do better than traditional theism).