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<p>Recently, Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini have argued that certain existing AI systems are capable of well-being. They consider the three leading approaches to well-being—hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the objective list approach—and argue that theories of these kinds plausibly imply that some current AI systems are capable of welfare. In this paper, I argue that the leading versions of each of these theories do not imply this. I conclude that we have strong reason to doubt that current AI systems are capable of well-being.</p>

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Are current AI systems capable of well-being?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月15日

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  • James Fanciullo

摘要

Recently, Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini have argued that certain existing AI systems are capable of well-being. They consider the three leading approaches to well-being—hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the objective list approach—and argue that theories of these kinds plausibly imply that some current AI systems are capable of welfare. In this paper, I argue that the leading versions of each of these theories do not imply this. I conclude that we have strong reason to doubt that current AI systems are capable of well-being.