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<p>In this commentary, I raise four objections to the view defended in Michael Pelczar’s book, <i>Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience</i>. First, I challenge his claim that physical things are identical to possibilities for experience even if there turns out to be some categorical reality underlying these possibilities. Second, I argue that Pelczar’s phenomenalism cannot accommodate the existence of some unobservable entities that we have good scientific reason to accept. Third, I argue that his view threatens to lead to massive indeterminacy about what the physical world is like. Fourth, I argue that phenomenalism fares much worse than its rivals with respect to the theoretical virtue of nomological parsimony, the ideal of keeping the fundamental laws simple.</p>

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Against phenomenalism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月28日

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  • Brian Cutter

摘要

In this commentary, I raise four objections to the view defended in Michael Pelczar’s book, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience. First, I challenge his claim that physical things are identical to possibilities for experience even if there turns out to be some categorical reality underlying these possibilities. Second, I argue that Pelczar’s phenomenalism cannot accommodate the existence of some unobservable entities that we have good scientific reason to accept. Third, I argue that his view threatens to lead to massive indeterminacy about what the physical world is like. Fourth, I argue that phenomenalism fares much worse than its rivals with respect to the theoretical virtue of nomological parsimony, the ideal of keeping the fundamental laws simple.