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<p>Philosophical epistemology attempts to fathom what knowledge is. Analytical philosophy, at least, seems to provide a&#xa0;clearly defined method for such a&#xa0;task. According to this method, an epistemological argumentation gets by without empirical-statistical investigations. Instead, it should contain a&#xa0;thought experiment that can serve as premises together with a&#xa0;reference to intuitions. Within such an argumentation, intuitions should have the function of evidence for or against a&#xa0;certain epistemological position. For around 20&#xa0;years, however, this method has been called into question by the so-called experimental philosophy movement. Its representatives import empirical methods from social psychology and attempt to test whether intuitions can actually fulfill the aforementioned function. On the basis of such an examination, experimental philosophers argue either for overcoming analytical philosophy or for expanding it to include social-psychological methods. The text illuminates the thrust of the experimental philosophical argumentation and attempts to show that experimental-philosophical work also cannot do without an empirically untested reference to intuitions, which can be seen as a&#xa0;challenge to the experimental-philosophical critique of the methods.</p>

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Wissen zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月13日

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  • Daniel Minkin

摘要

Philosophical epistemology attempts to fathom what knowledge is. Analytical philosophy, at least, seems to provide a clearly defined method for such a task. According to this method, an epistemological argumentation gets by without empirical-statistical investigations. Instead, it should contain a thought experiment that can serve as premises together with a reference to intuitions. Within such an argumentation, intuitions should have the function of evidence for or against a certain epistemological position. For around 20 years, however, this method has been called into question by the so-called experimental philosophy movement. Its representatives import empirical methods from social psychology and attempt to test whether intuitions can actually fulfill the aforementioned function. On the basis of such an examination, experimental philosophers argue either for overcoming analytical philosophy or for expanding it to include social-psychological methods. The text illuminates the thrust of the experimental philosophical argumentation and attempts to show that experimental-philosophical work also cannot do without an empirically untested reference to intuitions, which can be seen as a challenge to the experimental-philosophical critique of the methods.