<p>This study examines how voluntary disclosure (VD) practices and corporate governance mechanisms influence investment opportunities (IOs) in the Jordanian market, focusing on industrial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2016 and 2023. Drawing on agency and signaling theories, the research employs a panel dataset of 264 firm-year observations and applies a robust random-effects GLS regression model. The findings reveal that enhanced VD significantly improves IOs by mitigating information asymmetry and increasing transparency. Among governance factors, board size (BC) and the frequency of board meetings (BM) positively impact IOs, while board independence (BI), CEO duality (CD), and the presence of audit (AC) and nomination-remuneration committees (NRC) show no significant effect. The results underscore the critical role of disclosure and active board engagement in fostering investment potential, offering practical insights for regulators and corporate leaders in emerging economies. By promoting greater transparency and accountability, this study supports sustainable economic growth and the strengthening of institutional frameworks in emerging markets.</p>

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Board characteristics, board committees and voluntary disclosure as a catalyst of investment opportunities

  • Anas Ghazalat

摘要

This study examines how voluntary disclosure (VD) practices and corporate governance mechanisms influence investment opportunities (IOs) in the Jordanian market, focusing on industrial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2016 and 2023. Drawing on agency and signaling theories, the research employs a panel dataset of 264 firm-year observations and applies a robust random-effects GLS regression model. The findings reveal that enhanced VD significantly improves IOs by mitigating information asymmetry and increasing transparency. Among governance factors, board size (BC) and the frequency of board meetings (BM) positively impact IOs, while board independence (BI), CEO duality (CD), and the presence of audit (AC) and nomination-remuneration committees (NRC) show no significant effect. The results underscore the critical role of disclosure and active board engagement in fostering investment potential, offering practical insights for regulators and corporate leaders in emerging economies. By promoting greater transparency and accountability, this study supports sustainable economic growth and the strengthening of institutional frameworks in emerging markets.