<p>Public safety in Peru faces an unprecedented challenge due to the exponential growth of extortion, with recorded complaints increasing by nearly 740% between 2020 and 2023. This growing crisis is primarily concentrated in high-density urban areas, with Metropolitan Lima serving as the epicenter. Within this complex scenario, the urban transport sector has emerged as a vulnerable target due to its inherent informality, constant cash flow, and itinerant nature. This research aims to analyze extortion dynamics within this sector, examining criminal patterns, collection modalities, and mechanisms of territorial control in Metropolitan Lima. Adopting a qualitative phenomenological approach, the study utilized 21 semi-structured interviews with transport workers across Lima and three in-depth interviews with specialized police investigators. Findings reveal that extortion functions as a consolidated informal regulatory institution that fills the void left by state weakness. It typically originates as extra-legal protection used for conflict mediation and as a shield against municipal inspections or police interventions. Over time, these contingent contributions evolve into the regularized collection of "cupos" (extortion quotas), which are fully integrated into the productive cycle as a fixed operating cost. This criminal governance structures the informal regulation of routes and transit points, providing a functional order. To maintain this order, criminal actors employ selective violence as a pedagogical enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. This stability is fragile; when territorial control becomes fragmented, coercion mutates into lethal violence and homicides. Ultimately, addressing this crisis requires tackling the underlying informality and state absence that allow these organizations to function as alternative governance nodes.</p>