<p>This study investigates the association between ownership concentration and bank risk-taking, and examines whether board independence and government ownership moderate this relationship. Using a panel dataset of 197 Chinese commercial banks from 2010 to 2021, we employ fixed‑effects regressions with mean-centered variables, formal U-tests, and interaction models. The results suggest a U-shaped association between ownership concentration and bank risk: moderate concentration is associated with lower risk, while excessive concentration correlates with higher risk exposure. Further analysis provides evidence that board independence negatively moderates this U-shaped pattern, flattening the curve and attenuating the risk-increasing effect of high concentration. In contrast, government ownership appears to strengthen the convexity of the U-shaped relationship, making it more pronounced in state-controlled banks. These findings indicate that the association between ownership concentration and bank risk is not uniform but varies with governance structures and ownership regimes — though causal claims would require further validation, given the limitations of our estimation approach for nonlinear effects. The study contributes to the literature by systematically examining the moderating role of board independence and the amplifying effect of government ownership, using methodological refinements (centering, U-test, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors) to ensure robust inference. Our results offer suggestive evidence for bank governance, risk regulation, and ownership reforms in emerging economies.</p>