Scholarlink

<p>This paper investigates the premise of political uncertainty between institutional stability and economic growth at the regional level in Japan over the timeline of 2004–2023. It argues about the impacts that strong democratic institutions in Japan have on the disastrous effects of political uncertainty and how regional differences arise due to different institutional capabilities and economic vulnerabilities. A dynamic panel data model was used to investigate the effects of measures of political competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and those of corruption, social capital, and traditional economic factors on regional GDP growth. The findings indicate that growth and political competition have a relationship that is inverted U-shaped, which suggests that there is an optimum level of competition for creating maximum efficiency in the economy. Competition that is too low or too high tends to adversely affect growth through policy instability or inefficiency. It also looks at how the issues of institutional uncertainty, in the form of leadership changes and administrative transitions, impinge on the implementation of policies and possibly limit regional recovery, as exemplified in Tohoku after the earthquake in 2011. It is contrasted with the climate of institutional stability in Hokkaido, which sustained public investment and hence better regional resilience. We also look at the economic uncertainties that arise from outside shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and demographic challenges such as ageing and declining birth rates, which impact regional economies, especially the rural ones.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Japan at a crossroads: institutional stability in an era of crisis

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月11日

查看全文
  • Serdar Yay,
  • Melih Kabayel,
  • Meltem Ince Yenilmez

摘要

This paper investigates the premise of political uncertainty between institutional stability and economic growth at the regional level in Japan over the timeline of 2004–2023. It argues about the impacts that strong democratic institutions in Japan have on the disastrous effects of political uncertainty and how regional differences arise due to different institutional capabilities and economic vulnerabilities. A dynamic panel data model was used to investigate the effects of measures of political competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and those of corruption, social capital, and traditional economic factors on regional GDP growth. The findings indicate that growth and political competition have a relationship that is inverted U-shaped, which suggests that there is an optimum level of competition for creating maximum efficiency in the economy. Competition that is too low or too high tends to adversely affect growth through policy instability or inefficiency. It also looks at how the issues of institutional uncertainty, in the form of leadership changes and administrative transitions, impinge on the implementation of policies and possibly limit regional recovery, as exemplified in Tohoku after the earthquake in 2011. It is contrasted with the climate of institutional stability in Hokkaido, which sustained public investment and hence better regional resilience. We also look at the economic uncertainties that arise from outside shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and demographic challenges such as ageing and declining birth rates, which impact regional economies, especially the rural ones.