<p>The study examines the effectiveness of compensation mechanisms for employees engaged in hazardous and harmful working conditions in the Republic of Kazakhstan through an analysis of sectoral agreements regulating increased remuneration for occupational risks. The research focuses on the institutional and practical implementation of sectoral coefficients, inter-grade wage coefficients, and additional compensation mechanisms established within the framework of labor legislation and social partnership agreements. A comparative analysis of sectoral agreements in the coal, oil and gas, and transport industries was conducted using methods of institutional, legal, and comparative policy analysis. The comparison reveals a significant discrepancy between formally established compensation mechanisms and actual labor market remuneration practices. The results suggest that the existing system of sectoral coefficients has largely lost its compensatory, regulatory, and incentive functions due to outdated calculation principles, low transparency, and insufficient differentiation according to occupational risk levels. In practice, many enterprises compensate for these shortcomings by introducing additional local payments and bonuses outside the formal sectoral framework, leading to institutional fragmentation of the wage regulation system. The study also identifies a lack of transparency in wage structures, preventing workers from clearly identifying compensation related to hazardous working conditions. The paper argues for the transition from embedded sectoral coefficients toward a transparent risk-based compensation model linked to occupational risk assessment and workplace hazard classification. The proposed approach may contribute to improving labor protection governance, strengthening social partnership mechanisms, and increasing the effectiveness of occupational safety policies in Kazakhstan and other transitional economies.</p>