When agency fails? Structure and leadership in comparative perspective: democratic backsliding in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger
摘要
This paper investigates why recent democratic transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger reverted to military rule. It advances a dual explanatory framework-the Structure-Agency Interaction Model, emphasising that leadership agency operates within, and magnifies or mitigates, structural vulnerabilities. The paper utilises a qualitative comparative case-study design (2020–2023) based on the speeches of Bah Ndaw, Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba and Mohamed Bazoum, official communiqués, ECOWAS/AU documents, Afrobarometer surveys, ACLED conflict data, and reports by the UN/NGOs. The results point to three processes: (1) the proximate causes of coups are weak civilian control over militaries and presidential guards; (2) the mechanisms of building exclusionary coalitions and technocratic reform undermine legitimacy; and (3) a dependence on foreign security alliances recasts contestation as sovereignty politics. The framework refines transitology by specifying when and how agency matters under constraint. It also provides policy guidance on sequencing security-sector reform, coalition inclusion, and calibrated external engagement in fragile democracies.