<p>How do policy expectations affect street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement behavior tendencies? This study explores this issue based on expectation theory using a 2 (time expectations: long-term vs. short-term) * 2 (resistance expectations: strong resistance vs. weak resistance) survey experimental study. It was found that street-level bureaucrats’ policy expectations affect their enforcement behavior tendencies, and self-efficacy mediates the relationship. Short-term expectations weakened street-level bureaucrats’ strict enforcement behavior tendencies more than long-term expectations. Strong resistance expectations strengthened street-level bureaucrats’ strict enforcement behavior tendencies more than weak resistance expectations. The research not only expanded the theoretical framework of street-level bureaucratic behavior, but also provided practical references for optimizing the expected management and incentive mechanisms in policy implementation.</p>

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Policy expectations, self-efficacy, and street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement behavior tendencies: a survey experiment in China

  • Yingwei Wang,
  • Hong Pan

摘要

How do policy expectations affect street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement behavior tendencies? This study explores this issue based on expectation theory using a 2 (time expectations: long-term vs. short-term) * 2 (resistance expectations: strong resistance vs. weak resistance) survey experimental study. It was found that street-level bureaucrats’ policy expectations affect their enforcement behavior tendencies, and self-efficacy mediates the relationship. Short-term expectations weakened street-level bureaucrats’ strict enforcement behavior tendencies more than long-term expectations. Strong resistance expectations strengthened street-level bureaucrats’ strict enforcement behavior tendencies more than weak resistance expectations. The research not only expanded the theoretical framework of street-level bureaucratic behavior, but also provided practical references for optimizing the expected management and incentive mechanisms in policy implementation.