Equilibrium land use with collective housing developments: voting with feet and entrepreneurship
摘要
In urban economics, the monocentric city model has been widely used to analyze equilibrium land use in a city. However, these models often treat housing and land interchangeably and do not explicitly consider collective housing developments. This paper revisits a closed-city monocentric model and presents a framework for analyzing equilibrium land use, allowing for multiple types of housing developments, various consumer types, and arbitrary local government regulations on development. Our equilibrium concept, free-entry equilibrium, is a feasible allocation in which it is not possible to find a profitable housing development with an amenity/pricing policy that can attract tenant residents. To establish a foundation for the analysis, we prove the existence and (constrained) efficiency of the free-entry equilibrium in this model, incorporating local externalities and joint production of housing within each housing development, under minimal assumptions—continuity of utility and cost functions, and compact feasible sets.