<p>Nuclear security is based on a normative framework that emphasizes the singular responsibility of the state, and as a national responsibility, is rooted in principles of sovereignty. However, the absence of a verification mechanism for nuclear security challenges international trust and cooperation in a dynamic threat environment. As geopolitical tensions rise, emerging threats require a coordinated and transparent approach to nuclear security assurance. While verification has been a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, there is no similar mechanism in nuclear security due to various concerns, including the lack of international standards that could serve as a basis for verification. Furthermore, numerous considerations such as the absence of nuclear security crises, divergent political views, and the decline of multilateralism further complicate potential efforts for verification in this domain. In this context, the article explores whether nuclear security verification is feasible and, more importantly, whether verification would be acceptable through an examination of how states can balance their sovereign responsibilities with the need to provide transparency and assurances to the international community. The study draws on lessons from existing verification regimes, identifies nuclear security areas that can be subject to verification, and analyzes potential mechanisms, while the findings highlight potential pathways for developing an internationally accepted nuclear security verification system. These findings provide insights into international discourse on how states can work collectively to assure one another that adequate nuclear security measures are in place without compromising national interests or security sensitivities.</p>