<p>This article examines the growing risk of a severe political–military crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan and analyzes the structural, perceptual, and institutional factors that complicate effective crisis prevention and management. It argues that Washington and Beijing are increasingly locked in a mutually reinforcing cycle of deterrence signaling and strategic mistrust that heightens the danger of escalation even in the absence of deliberate intent to provoke conflict. The analysis identifies a range of obstacles to crisis stability, encompassing divergent understandings of crisis management versus crisis prevention, asymmetries in political and military decision-making systems, misinterpretations of signaling behavior, differing concepts of credibility and escalation, and the impact of domestic political pressures and historical memory. The article further contends that existing crisis management mechanisms—focused largely on operational-level military interactions—are insufficient to address the broader political drivers of instability. To mitigate these risks, it proposes a more comprehensive framework that involves both civilian and military actors, including a two-tier dialogue structure, shared crisis guidelines, enhanced communication channels, crisis manuals, and more sustained Track I, Track 1.5, and Track II engagement. By emphasizing the need to combine credible deterrence with equally credible reassurance, the article outlines possible pathways for reducing escalation risks while preserving the fundamental interests of both sides.</p>