<p>The culture of justification has become one of the most refined languages through which liberal constitutionalism understands its own legitimacy. Its central promise is that public power should be answerable to those whom it burdens, especially through rights-based proportionality review and a deeper right to justification. This article reconstructs that promise in its doctrinal and philosophical forms and then subjects it to an immanent critique. The argument is that the justificatory paradigm tends to stage power as a discrete, attributable act that can be contested by an addressee before an institution capable of receiving reasons. That staging has considerable normative force, yet it leaves a residue: forms of structural and economic domination that are legally produced without appearing as particular justificatory events. Property, contract, corporate form, and market architecture frequently operate as background conditions of reason-giving, while the paradigm more readily interrogates the later public act that interferes with them. A more adequate culture of justification would have to treat legal structures themselves as objects of contestation and connect public reasons to the social positions from which reasons can be demanded, supplied, and refused.</p>