<p>This study examines the normative grounds for criticising double standards in human rights as practised by public authorities—an issue arguably more complex than direct violations, yet no less intolerable. It begins by distinguishing between two types of double standards—those involving fundamental interests and those that are more contested—as well as between their agents: individuals and institutions. Building on this framework, the study explores the conditions under which hypocritical blame may be criticised, first in the case of individuals and then in that of institutions. First, even when an authority retains the standing to invoke human rights norms, institutional double standards are shown to undermine its legitimacy by violating two core principles of the rule of law: non-contradiction and congruence. Second, the study reconstructs institutional obligations from a role-based perspective, offering a new theoretical justification for the criticism of hypocrisy in the human rights context. It argues that the hypocrisy of role-holders may be condemned not only on grounds of personal integrity and obligations to others, but also as an abuse of shared values. Ultimately, it demonstrates that even if a hypocritical authority retains the standing to criticise, their double standards undermine the values they purport to uphold and thus deserve normative condemnation.</p>