<p>This article is a critique of Osborne and Allchin’s (2024) article, “Science literacy in the twenty-first century: informed trust and the competent outsider”. It examines their proposition for science education reform aimed at cultivating students as “competent outsiders” capable of making informed judgments about scientific claims. Osborne and Allchin criticize current science education for its narrow focus on educating future scientists, emphasizing intellectual independence and school-based education. They argue for the development of skills to assess the credibility of sources, highlighting informed trust over blind trust. Our critique agrees with the importance of social dimensions in science education but argues against the proposed dismissal of intellectual independence, warning it could lead to intellectual subservience and deference. Additionally, the critique questions the dichotomy between experts and non-experts, suggesting it may foster elitism. It also notes the already burdened science education agenda, advocating for simpler, more legitimate educational goals. The critique suggests focusing on core scientific processes, experiencing entire research cycles, and fostering intellectual independence to build earned trust in science, rather than explicitly teaching trust in scientific institutions.</p>

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Beyond Blind Trust and Informed Trust: Earned Trust? A Critique of Osborne and Allchin (2024)

  • Patrice Potvin,
  • Bénédicte Boissard,
  • Patrick Charland

摘要

This article is a critique of Osborne and Allchin’s (2024) article, “Science literacy in the twenty-first century: informed trust and the competent outsider”. It examines their proposition for science education reform aimed at cultivating students as “competent outsiders” capable of making informed judgments about scientific claims. Osborne and Allchin criticize current science education for its narrow focus on educating future scientists, emphasizing intellectual independence and school-based education. They argue for the development of skills to assess the credibility of sources, highlighting informed trust over blind trust. Our critique agrees with the importance of social dimensions in science education but argues against the proposed dismissal of intellectual independence, warning it could lead to intellectual subservience and deference. Additionally, the critique questions the dichotomy between experts and non-experts, suggesting it may foster elitism. It also notes the already burdened science education agenda, advocating for simpler, more legitimate educational goals. The critique suggests focusing on core scientific processes, experiencing entire research cycles, and fostering intellectual independence to build earned trust in science, rather than explicitly teaching trust in scientific institutions.