This paper explores the intricate phenomenon of moral conflicts, where agents face conflicting obligations. Using the standard system of deontic logic (SDL) as a framework, we analyze the theoretical impossibility of moral conflicts and critique its adequacy through examples from Hindu sacred narrative traditions (often described as “narrative theology” Sherma 2020) and western philosophical thought. We argue that SDL’s rigid principles often fail to accommodate genuine moral conflicts and propose a reconsideration of alternative logical frameworks. In the exclusive analysis of Arjuna’s dilemma where the logical explanation describes why two conflicting ought judgments cannot both be true; moral internalism plays a key part in the intuitive description of Arjuna’s mindset. By examining strategies such as distinguishing prima facie and all-things-considered obligations, as well as insights from Kantian ethics, we argue that the denial of true moral conflicts is theoretically plausible. This study contributes to deontic logic and moral philosophy by highlighting the need for nuanced approaches to conflicting obligations. This work aims for mutual illumination while respecting the original philosophical sophistication of Hindu sacred traditions.
