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<p>Do contemporary diagnostic-classificatory and theoretical frameworks reify neurodivergence by&#xa0;defining and categorizing it as disorders of coherence? The paper addresses this question strictly in reference to the Madhyamaka critique of reification. The tropes and heuristics of <i>svabhāva</i> (intrinsic existence), <i>śūnyatā</i> (emptiness), and <i>satyadvaya</i> (two truths) inform its investigations. The paper does not question any claims to therapeutic efficacy. To get off the ground, it merely unearths the tacit ontological commitment within conceptions of mental ‘health’ and ‘disorders’. Is mental ‘health’ coherence with normalcy? Is it possible to define mental ‘disorders’ independently of conceptions of <i>world</i>? If yes, would the definitions not be circular? Conceptions of ‘health’ would necessarily presuppose the contrastive of the pathological, and vice-versa. Conversely,&#xa0;<i>bracketing</i> the world reifies all pre-existing worlds as legitimate normative sources. Does the Madhyamaka refutation of ultimate reality preserve normativity for distinguishing mental ‘health’ from ‘disorders’? For the Madhyamaka, a mental ‘disorder’ may first of all be a failure of communication.</p>

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A Madhyamaka Perspective on Mental ‘Disorders’

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月15日

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  • Stalin Joseph Correya

摘要

Do contemporary diagnostic-classificatory and theoretical frameworks reify neurodivergence by defining and categorizing it as disorders of coherence? The paper addresses this question strictly in reference to the Madhyamaka critique of reification. The tropes and heuristics of svabhāva (intrinsic existence), śūnyatā (emptiness), and satyadvaya (two truths) inform its investigations. The paper does not question any claims to therapeutic efficacy. To get off the ground, it merely unearths the tacit ontological commitment within conceptions of mental ‘health’ and ‘disorders’. Is mental ‘health’ coherence with normalcy? Is it possible to define mental ‘disorders’ independently of conceptions of world? If yes, would the definitions not be circular? Conceptions of ‘health’ would necessarily presuppose the contrastive of the pathological, and vice-versa. Conversely, bracketing the world reifies all pre-existing worlds as legitimate normative sources. Does the Madhyamaka refutation of ultimate reality preserve normativity for distinguishing mental ‘health’ from ‘disorders’? For the Madhyamaka, a mental ‘disorder’ may first of all be a failure of communication.