<p>This paper proposes understanding agency as a relational, dynamic, and hybrid phenomenon, one that incorporates both the subject and the context in which they interact. Starting from the premise that agency depends on the individual’s intention and will in acting, the notion of affordance (Gibson, 1979) is employed to analyze how agency is situated within the environment. This perspective is contrasted with that of action patterns (Velleman, 2009) to address limitations that affordances alone cannot resolve. It is argued that what we perceive in social contexts and what offers us possibilities for action goes beyond affordances, taking shape as patterns of action that link the perceived object, the agent, and their environment. These patterns, mentally stored and embodied, function as behavioral guides that allow the recognition of action opportunities during interaction, making our actions intelligible and adaptively appropriate. Consequently, agency does not reside solely in the mind of the subject but emerges from interaction with other agents and with elements of the social context. This hybrid view surpasses the dichotomy between perceptualism and cognitivism, integrating components from both perspectives to offer a more comprehensive understanding of agency in social scenarios.</p>

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In Defense of Hybrid Agency: Affordances and Action Patterns

  • Mercedes Rivero-Obra

摘要

This paper proposes understanding agency as a relational, dynamic, and hybrid phenomenon, one that incorporates both the subject and the context in which they interact. Starting from the premise that agency depends on the individual’s intention and will in acting, the notion of affordance (Gibson, 1979) is employed to analyze how agency is situated within the environment. This perspective is contrasted with that of action patterns (Velleman, 2009) to address limitations that affordances alone cannot resolve. It is argued that what we perceive in social contexts and what offers us possibilities for action goes beyond affordances, taking shape as patterns of action that link the perceived object, the agent, and their environment. These patterns, mentally stored and embodied, function as behavioral guides that allow the recognition of action opportunities during interaction, making our actions intelligible and adaptively appropriate. Consequently, agency does not reside solely in the mind of the subject but emerges from interaction with other agents and with elements of the social context. This hybrid view surpasses the dichotomy between perceptualism and cognitivism, integrating components from both perspectives to offer a more comprehensive understanding of agency in social scenarios.