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<p>In his treatise on morality in the <i>Summa Theologiae</i> (<i>Prima Secundae</i>, Questions 18–21), Thomas Aquinas develops a&#xa0;fine-grained model for evaluating the goodness or badness of human actions in various dimensions. In doing so, he regularly draws on analogies and parallels from ontology and natural philosophy. This article examines these recourses in detail and shows (using the example of theft, among others) how Thomas specifies moral actions by looking at their object, their goals and their circumstances; it becomes clear that Thomas may assign one and the same moral action to more than one kind, thus allowing for a&#xa0;plural specification. The application of the hylemorphic pattern of form and matter to moral action, in particular to the relationship between the inner and outer act, is also examined in some detail. Despite the distinction between these two moments, Thomas wishes to strengthen the inner unity of moral action and thereby distinguish the realm of the moral (<i>genus moris</i>) from that of the natural (<i>genus naturae</i>). By highlighting the external action in its moral relevance, he refrains from reducing morality to intentionality (as Peter Abelard had done before him). In conclusion, the article shows that Thomas does not derive ethics or practical reason from theoretical philosophy, despite his frequent recourse to ontological categories, and that his quasi-substantial model of considering the goodness or badness of moral actions still has some appeal today.</p>

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Die menschliche Handlung als sittlich Seiendes.

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月15日

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  • Jörn Müller

摘要

In his treatise on morality in the Summa Theologiae (Prima Secundae, Questions 18–21), Thomas Aquinas develops a fine-grained model for evaluating the goodness or badness of human actions in various dimensions. In doing so, he regularly draws on analogies and parallels from ontology and natural philosophy. This article examines these recourses in detail and shows (using the example of theft, among others) how Thomas specifies moral actions by looking at their object, their goals and their circumstances; it becomes clear that Thomas may assign one and the same moral action to more than one kind, thus allowing for a plural specification. The application of the hylemorphic pattern of form and matter to moral action, in particular to the relationship between the inner and outer act, is also examined in some detail. Despite the distinction between these two moments, Thomas wishes to strengthen the inner unity of moral action and thereby distinguish the realm of the moral (genus moris) from that of the natural (genus naturae). By highlighting the external action in its moral relevance, he refrains from reducing morality to intentionality (as Peter Abelard had done before him). In conclusion, the article shows that Thomas does not derive ethics or practical reason from theoretical philosophy, despite his frequent recourse to ontological categories, and that his quasi-substantial model of considering the goodness or badness of moral actions still has some appeal today.