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<p>In this article I&#xa0;discuss an ambivalent legacy central to Kant’s ethics: while Kant’s conception of autonomy and dignity emphasizes the equal moral consideration of all persons, it leads to the exclusion of people with cognitive disabilities, who are at best only indirectly morally considered. I&#xa0;analyze prominent attempts to overcome this problem through interpretative approaches and reform proposals within Kant’s ethics, and show their limitations. Finally, I&#xa0;argue for a&#xa0;relational and inclusive reinterpretation of autonomy and dignity.</p>

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Wie inklusiv ist Kants Ethik?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月6日

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  • Anna Wehofsits

摘要

In this article I discuss an ambivalent legacy central to Kant’s ethics: while Kant’s conception of autonomy and dignity emphasizes the equal moral consideration of all persons, it leads to the exclusion of people with cognitive disabilities, who are at best only indirectly morally considered. I analyze prominent attempts to overcome this problem through interpretative approaches and reform proposals within Kant’s ethics, and show their limitations. Finally, I argue for a relational and inclusive reinterpretation of autonomy and dignity.