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<p><?tk 3?>Significant renewed interest in Rawls’s original position has emerged. In this article, I argue that the recent original position arguments, despite their increased sophistication regarding decision-theoretic considerations behind the veil of ignorance or attempts to bypass such considerations, still talk past each other. In an important way, the arguments have it backwards. The significance of original position arguments, especially for contemporary pluralistic societies, lies not in defending a unique moral outcome due to the application of formal methods, but rather in justifying the moral assumptions that inform the design of the original position and their best formalization.</p>

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Original Positions, Decision Theory, and the Difference Principle

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月26日

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  • Michael Moehler

摘要

Significant renewed interest in Rawls’s original position has emerged. In this article, I argue that the recent original position arguments, despite their increased sophistication regarding decision-theoretic considerations behind the veil of ignorance or attempts to bypass such considerations, still talk past each other. In an important way, the arguments have it backwards. The significance of original position arguments, especially for contemporary pluralistic societies, lies not in defending a unique moral outcome due to the application of formal methods, but rather in justifying the moral assumptions that inform the design of the original position and their best formalization.