Dreierbündnis für Österreich: Die Bildung der „Zuckerl-Koalition“ im Lichte formaler Koalitionstheorie
摘要
The article examines the government formation in Austria following the 2024 legislative election and explores to what extent the complex process of coalition-building can be explained from a coalition-theoretical perspective. The FPÖ became the strongest party for the first time, the ÖVP suffered its largest loss of votes in history, and the SPÖ achieved its worst result at the federal level. The seat shares gained by NEOS and the Greens also meant that a potential coalition of ÖVP and SPÖ would only narrowly achieve an absolute majority, with 92 out of 183 seats. The election thus resulted in a situation that foreshadowed difficult coalition negotiations. After an initial attempt to form a government consisting of ÖVP, SPÖ, and NEOS failed, bilateral negotiations between ÖVP and SPÖ, as well as later between FPÖ and ÖVP, also failed to produce an agreement. In the second attempt, ÖVP, SPÖ, and NEOS were able to form their three-party coalition. The formal coalition analysis shows that the resulting government does not represent an equilibrium solution based on the office- and policy-motivations of the parties involved, but rather that its formation followed strategic necessities.