Strategic Avoidance: China’s Earmarked Funding in the United Nations Amid Sino-US Competition
摘要
How do rising powers seek influence in multilateral institutions that remain deeply shaped by established powers? As a prominent rising power, China is often portrayed as challenging US primacy in this domain. Yet systematic quantitative evidence on its behaviour across multilateral organisations remains limited. This study examines how China allocates earmarked funding across United Nations organisations in response to US influence. Although earmarking can advance Beijing’s global governance ambitions, Washington’s deep-seated influence may either lower the expected returns on spending or raise the costs of competition. This article conceptualises strategic avoidance to explain how China manages this dilemma by avoiding head-on competition with the US while actively engaging in strategically salient organisations to avoid ceding key arenas of future leadership. Drawing on an original dataset from 2013 to 2024 compiled from the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, official websites of UN entities, the database of Xi Jinping’s Important Speeches, and policy papers, the study finds that China is less likely to earmark UN agencies with greater reliance on US earmarks and a higher share of US staff. This avoidance is stronger in entities that fall within Beijing’s policy priorities but shifts toward co-movement in organisations led by US nationals. These findings highlight the underexplored role of US influence in China’s funding allocation, offering new insights into how China navigates great-power competition in multilateral settings. The study adds nuance to the prevailing narrative that China is undermining the US-led liberal international order and contributes to broader debates on its future trajectory.