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<p>This paper introduces a system-theoretic rethinking of democracy as a bounded, oscillatory system driven by contestation among liberty, equality, and security—normative goods uniquely integrated through Arrow’s impossibility theorem (cycling instability), Riker’s heresthetics (strategic reweighting), and Lyapunov stability theory (bounded dynamics). Unlike institutionalist or regression-based approaches, it formalizes illiberal drift as endogenous oscillation within a procedural basin (free elections), rather than linear decay, using differential equations and a new Democratic Oscillation Simulator. Crucially, the model incorporates a normative cost function, showing that oscillation is not free: democracy produces the good, the bad, and the ugly. Liberal recalibrations, illiberal reconfigurations, and institutional distortions all generate measurable costs, yet remain structurally bounded so long as electoral openness persists. Stylized case studies (Turkey, Poland, Brazil, Singapore, Israel, USA) demonstrate how democracies absorb shocks and adjust norms without collapsing, rejecting scalar metaphors (erosion, decay) and resilience clichés. This theoretical model, with rigorous proofs and adaptable parameters, explains multidimensional variation non-causally, enabling empirical applications without requiring them.</p>

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The Rikerian Arrow at the Heart of Democratic Backsliding: A System Theory Approach

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月15日

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  • Dwayne Woods

摘要

This paper introduces a system-theoretic rethinking of democracy as a bounded, oscillatory system driven by contestation among liberty, equality, and security—normative goods uniquely integrated through Arrow’s impossibility theorem (cycling instability), Riker’s heresthetics (strategic reweighting), and Lyapunov stability theory (bounded dynamics). Unlike institutionalist or regression-based approaches, it formalizes illiberal drift as endogenous oscillation within a procedural basin (free elections), rather than linear decay, using differential equations and a new Democratic Oscillation Simulator. Crucially, the model incorporates a normative cost function, showing that oscillation is not free: democracy produces the good, the bad, and the ugly. Liberal recalibrations, illiberal reconfigurations, and institutional distortions all generate measurable costs, yet remain structurally bounded so long as electoral openness persists. Stylized case studies (Turkey, Poland, Brazil, Singapore, Israel, USA) demonstrate how democracies absorb shocks and adjust norms without collapsing, rejecting scalar metaphors (erosion, decay) and resilience clichés. This theoretical model, with rigorous proofs and adaptable parameters, explains multidimensional variation non-causally, enabling empirical applications without requiring them.