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<p>In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed.</p>

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Bargaining Agendas as Strategic Tools

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月1日

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  • Domenico Buccella,
  • Luciano Fanti

摘要

In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed.