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<p>The conventional understanding of a constitutional edifice is that the law-making, law enforcement, and law protection vested in three different branches of government are the paragon of a just division of powers. This concept, as developed by Montesquieu, has been used to date to justify a checks and balances arrangement among the three branches, i.e., the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. However, the time has come to ponder the reality that this ternary framework needs another check that can be well above the politics of the government and act as a fourth branch of the new state. This article explores the need to protect the <i>Fourth Branch</i> in India (Fourth Branch as originally advocated by Mark Tushnet, in his 2021 book, <i>The New Fourth Branch</i>), which inculcates the institutions that have been established to fasten the accountability of the political party-led government and protect the constitution itself. This study focuses particularly on the analysis of the Information Commissions and the Election Commission of India as components of this new branch. Through examples, we cognise that&#xa0;the mere existence of these institutions is not enough and that they need to be armoured to preserve our constitutional integrity.</p>

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The accountable government: Reconceptualising the Separation approach for liberating the Fourth Branch Institutes in India

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月11日

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  • Ananya Sharma

摘要

The conventional understanding of a constitutional edifice is that the law-making, law enforcement, and law protection vested in three different branches of government are the paragon of a just division of powers. This concept, as developed by Montesquieu, has been used to date to justify a checks and balances arrangement among the three branches, i.e., the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. However, the time has come to ponder the reality that this ternary framework needs another check that can be well above the politics of the government and act as a fourth branch of the new state. This article explores the need to protect the Fourth Branch in India (Fourth Branch as originally advocated by Mark Tushnet, in his 2021 book, The New Fourth Branch), which inculcates the institutions that have been established to fasten the accountability of the political party-led government and protect the constitution itself. This study focuses particularly on the analysis of the Information Commissions and the Election Commission of India as components of this new branch. Through examples, we cognise that the mere existence of these institutions is not enough and that they need to be armoured to preserve our constitutional integrity.