<p>Stewart Cohen points out that in David Lewis’ epistemic contextualism the solution to the Gettier problem is achieved by regarding the subject and the ascriber as the same person in the Gettier kind counter examples. Cohen extends the Gettier kind counter example by considering the subject and the ascriber as two different persons and shows that Lewis’ contextualism doesn’t really resolve the Gettier problem. In this paper I suggest that a proper distinction between the subject and the ascriber be drawn when they are the same person which is the aim of this paper. I generally call this issue (the issue which arises when the subject and the ascriber is same) as the problem of the First-Person-Pronoun-Knowledge-Ascriptive-Sentences. In this paper my aim is to work out a way to distinguish between the subject and the ascriber by distinguishing between the subject’s actuality and the ascriber’s actuality.</p>